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I am delighted to join in this Tribute to the remarkable 
judicial career of Minnesota Supreme Court Justice John E. 
Simonett—a great justice and, equally important, a great human 
being.  I remember Justice Simonett with deep respect and 
affection.  During my years as dean of the University of Minnesota 
Law School, I could always count on Justice Simonett to enliven any 
program with his erudite and pithy remarks, his wit, and his joyful 
presence.  I remember particularly a Judges in Residence program 
in which Justice Simonett and Justice Anthony Kennedy of the 
Supreme Court of the United States were the stars of the program, 
with their thoughtful comments and witty repartee.  Justice 
Simonett’s death was a loss to all who love the law, and it is highly 
appropriate that this Tribute recognizes and honors his numerous 
contributions to the law and our profession. 
When we think of Justice Simonett’s remarkable and scholarly 
opinions, we think first about how eloquent they were, how they 
read so well, how they told stories about common people caught up 
 
       †  Everett Fraser Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.  I 
wish to thank Edwin Stockmeyer of the University of Minnesota Law School class 
of 2013 for his excellent research and assistance in the preparation of this article. 
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in one of life’s disputes, and how they developed and advanced the 
common law.  But Justice Simonett’s opinions also set forth a 
judicial philosophy of federal and state constitutional law in several 
cases that came to the Minnesota Supreme Court during his 
fourteen years as a justice. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Justice Simonett served the state during a time of unique 
developments in its constitutional law.1  During the 1960s, the 
Warren Court aggressively recognized and applied various civil 
liberties claims against the states.  The effect, as Justice Simonett 
once noted, was a “nationwide re-emergence of state 
constitutions.”2  As litigation in state courts increasingly focused on 
questions of federal constitutional law, it was only natural for 
lawyers and judges to look comparatively at similar provisions and 
guarantees within their state constitutions.  In a large sense, then, 
Justice Simonett’s tenure on the court3 tracked a period of 
significant development of constitutional law in Minnesota. 
Justice Simonett’s constitutional opinions contributed much to 
this development, particularly toward how the Minnesota 
Constitution should be read and applied.  Throughout his 
opinions, three important themes emerge.  First, Justice Simonett 
steadfastly insisted that the constitution be read as a set of broadly 
applicable general principles that guides the legislature, rather 
than as imposing an inventory of detailed rules.  Second, and 
relatedly, questions of constitutional law must attend to the specific 
facts before the court, as general principles can only apply with 
proper factual attention.  And third, Justice Simonett maintained 
the Minnesota Constitution’s independence from its federal 
counterpart, as evidenced by Minnesota’s unique approach to 
equal protection, its heightened protection of religious liberties, 
and the final disposition of the famous Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. 
case.4 
 
 1.  See John E. Simonett, An Introduction to Essays on the Minnesota Constitution, 
20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 227, 227 (1994) (recalling that, during the 1950s, 1960s, 
and 1970s, lawyers found “few occasions to invoke the state constitution”). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Justice Simonett served on the court from 1980–1994.  Biographies of the 
Justices of the Minnesota Supreme Court, MINN. ST. L. LIBR., http:// 
www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/judgebio.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2012). 
 4.  479 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. 1992). 
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II. THE CONSTITUTION AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
One of the most distinctive features of Justice Simonett’s vision 
of constitutional law was his steadfast refusal to read specific, 
bright-line rules into Minnesota’s constitution.  According to 
Justice Simonett, such situation-specific rules are the domain of the 
legislature, whose job it is to govern individual transactions and 
associations, or as he called it, “the mundane and the immediate.”5  
Citing a case he did not author, Justice Simonett explained this 
distinction between legislation and constitutional law as the 
difference between the functions of a system and the conditions 
that allow that system to operate.6 
For example, in Wegan v. Village of Lexington,7 Justice Simonett 
dissented from the majority, which struck down as unconstitutional 
legislation imposing certain procedural requirements in order to 
file a dram shop claim related to the service of beverages exceeding 
3.2% alcohol.8  These statutory procedural requirements differed 
from those existing under Minnesota common law to bring similar 
claims related to the service of beverages containing less than 3.2% 
alcohol.9  Justice Simonett largely agreed with the majority that the 
distinction between so-called “intoxicating” and “non-intoxicating” 
beverages suggested “constitutional infirmities.”10  He argued, 
however, that such specific rules could not be adequately 
reconciled through “piecemeal judicial legislation” and should be 
left for the legislature to remedy.11 
A more explicit example of Justice Simonett’s emphasis on 
constitutional guidelines is his majority opinion in Schmidt v. 
Modern Metals Foundry, Inc., which upheld recent legislative 
amendments to the state’s Workers’ Compensation Act (“the 
Act”).12  In Schmidt, the plaintiff suffered disfiguring burns to 
 
 5.  Simonett, supra note 1, at 230. 
 6.  Id. at 229–30 (quoting Bd. of Supervisors v. Heenan, 2 Minn. 330, 332 
(1858)). 
 7.  309 N.W.2d 273 (Minn. 1981). 
 8.  Id. at 281 (holding that the commencement-of-suit and notice-of-claim 
provisions of MINN. STAT. § 340.951 (1980) “violate the equal protection clause of 
the United States and Minnesota Constitutions”).  Section 340.951 has been 
recodified as MINN. STAT. § 340A.802 (2010). 
 9.  Wegan, 309 N.W.2d at 277 (describing Minnesota’s recognition of a 
common-law negligence claim for the “unlawful sale of 3.2 beer”). 
 10.  Id. at 285 (Simonett, J., dissenting). 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Schmidt v. Modern Metals Foundry, Inc., 424 N.W.2d 538, 542 (Minn. 
1988) (holding that the Act did not violate the certain remedies clause of 
3
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multiple parts of his body.13  But the Act’s amended schedule for 
determining an employee’s compensation did not cover the 
injuries Schmidt sustained on his foot, back, and leg.14  Prior to the 
Act’s recent amendments, such injuries were eligible for 
compensation.15  Schmidt argued that the legislature’s decision to 
eliminate this coverage violated Minnesota’s constitutional 
guarantee of “certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or 
wrongs.”16 
Justice Simonett’s majority opinion explicitly emphasized that 
the “certain remedy clause is a constitutional declaration of general 
principles,”17 and that the legislature’s judgment with respect to 
particular remedies could only be constitutionally deficient if the 
overall compensatory scheme was unreasonable.18  In other words, 
because the constitution does not inventory particular rules, it is 
constitutionally insignificant that the plaintiff received less 
compensation than he would have under the old schedule. 
Perhaps the clearest example of Justice Simonett’s vision of 
constitutional law is his four-sentence dissent in State v. Hamm.19  In 
Hamm, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of a statute 
providing for six-person juries in misdemeanor and gross 
misdemeanor criminal trials.20  The majority held that the term 
“jury” has always been assumed to incorporate a twelve-member 
requirement.21 
 
 
Minnesota’s constitution). 
 13.  Id. at 539 (describing the location and nature of the plaintiff’s injuries). 
 14.  Id. at 541 (“[T]he new schedule does not compensate for some 
symptoms a burn victim may have . . . or for some cosmetic disfigurement . . . .”). 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. at 539 (quoting MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8).  Article I, section 8, of the 
Minnesota Constitution is otherwise known as the “certain remedy clause.” 
 17.  Schmidt, 424 N.W.2d at 540. 
 18.  Id. at 541 (“[T]o mount a successful attack on the new disability 
schedules, [the employee] must do more than raise objections to some aspect of 
the schedules; he must make a showing that the overall compensation scheme is 
not a reasonable substitute.”). 
 19.  423 N.W.2d 379, 390 (Minn. 1988) (Simonett, J., dissenting), superseded by 
constitutional amendment, MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“In all other criminal 
prosecutions, the legislature may provide for the number of jurors, provided that a 
jury have at least six members.”). 
 20.  Id. at 380 (majority opinion) (distinguishing between the provisions of 
MINN. STAT. § 593.01 (1986), providing for six- and twelve-member juries in 
misdemeanor and felony trials, respectively). 
 21.  Id. at 382 (“[A] 12-person jury is written into the constitution by decision 
of this court as if it were expressly stated in the original constitution itself.”). 
4
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Justice Simonett disagreed, arguing that even if the framers of 
Minnesota’s constitution did have in mind the specific number 
twelve, they chose not to insert “the number . . . into the 
document.”22  Clearly invoking Chief Justice John Marshall’s 
famous proclamation in  McCulloch v. Maryland,23 Justice Simonett 
argued that “[w]e are construing a constitution and, within that 
context, it appears the framers chose not to spell out the size of the 
jury, preferring to leave the number to the good judgment of 
future generations.”24  Justice Simonett preferred not to read into 
the constitution a specific rule for twelve-member juries, not just 
because it does not explicitly appear in the document, but because 
constitutions reflect the intentions of a sovereign people, not a 
specific legislative body.25  In his view, therefore, broad principles 
should remain broad so as to best allow the legislature to enact 
specific rules that give effect to the people’s intent.  Thus, in 
Hamm, Justice Simonett believed the court should respect the 
legislature’s creation of a six-member misdemeanor trial jury so 
long as it met the people’s general definition of a jury. 
III. FACTUAL ANALYSIS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
One way Justice Simonett distinguishes between constitutional 
law and the common law is the former’s tendency to focus more on 
ideas than the latter, which is primarily fact oriented.26  Still, Justice 
Simonett consistently emphasized the need to attend to the factual 
details of a particular case in order to correctly apply general 
constitutional principles.  As he once wrote, “[T]ugging against the 
law’s abstractness is the law’s need to be grounded in fact.”27  Two 
of Justice Simonett’s opinions in particular—Bolin v. Minnesota 
Department of Public Safety28 and Hegenes v. State29—demonstrate his 
 
 22.  Id. at 390 (Simonett, J., dissenting). 
 23.  17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (“[W]e must never forget that it is a 
constitution we are expounding.”). 
 24.  Hamm, 423 N.W.2d at 390 (Simonett, J., dissenting). 
 25.  See Simonett, supra note 1, at 229 (arguing that constitutional 
interpretation must give effect to “the intention of the sovereign people, not the 
legislature”). 
 26.  Id. at 230 (arguing that while constitutional law relies on a document of 
broadly applicable guidelines, the common law “is free to develop its own 
rules . . . , building on its own precedent, modifying and changing that precedent 
as the need arises, and sticking close to the facts”). 
 27.  Id. at 232. 
 28.  313 N.W.2d 381, 385–87 (Minn. 1981) (Simonett, J., dissenting). 
 29.  328 N.W.2d 719 (Minn. 1983). 
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insistence on welding law to fact, particularly in equal protection 
cases. 
In Bolin, the court held unconstitutional a “resign to run” 
policy, which required any highway patrolman who wished to run 
for county sheriff to resign his post, causing him or her to lose all 
accumulated seniority.30  The majority held that the requirement 
violated equal protection because highway patrolmen running for 
sheriff were subject to requirements not applicable to other officers 
running for sheriff or other highway patrolmen running for 
different elected positions.31  These classifications were 
impermissible because the state interest pursued—maintaining 
harmony between individual patrolmen and local sheriffs—could 
be achieved by allowing for a temporary leave of absence rather 
than a full resignation.32 
Justice Simonett disagreed with this conclusion.  Although the 
“resign to run” rule did treat highway patrolmen differently from 
other officers, Justice Simonett argued that the rule reflected 
professional responsibilities and daily duties unique to highway 
patrolmen.33  Highway patrolmen were, in his view, justifiably 
subject to differential treatment because they had a peculiar 
relationship with local sheriffs and were therefore not “similarly 
situated” with other types of law enforcement officers.34  According 
to Justice Simonett, the real, factual differences between classes of 
law enforcement officials justified dissimilar treatment. 
Justice Simonett’s majority opinion in Hegenes similarly focused 
on factual distinctions justifying differential legal treatment.  In 
that case, a taxpayer contested the constitutionality of the state’s 
differential treatment of nonhomestead residential properties of 
three or fewer units and nonhomestead residential properties of 
more than three units.35  The court upheld the statute, holding that 
there are real differences between small and large residential 
 
 30.  Bolin, 313 N.W.2d at 381–83 (majority opinion) (describing the “resign 
to run” policy). 
 31.  Id. at 384. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  See id. at 385 (Simonett, J., dissenting) (“There is no other class of state 
employees or law enforcement group quite like [the Minnesota Highway 
Patrol].”). 
 34.  See id. (describing how, unlike other law enforcement officers, highway 
patrolmen are statutorily required to cooperate with local sheriffs, are “obligated 
to follow [the sheriff’s] rules,” and routinely use the sheriff’s equipment and 
facilities). 
 35.  Hegenes v. State, 328 N.W.2d 719, 720 (Minn. 1983). 
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properties.36  Justice Simonett observed that a larger property may 
consume more of the state’s fire and police resources than a 
smaller property and that smaller residences may “have 
proportionately more tax attributed to land value as compared to 
building value.”37  Such observations indicate that different sized 
residential properties are not “similarly situated” and, therefore, 
may be taxed differently by the state.38 
As many of Justice Simonett’s opinions demonstrate, equal 
protection of the law is a very broad principle, applicable in a 
variety of legal contexts.  However, his application of that principle 
and his insistence that the legislature be deferred to when classes of 
citizens are not “similarly situated” demonstrates that such abstract 
and generally applicable principles can only be applied with 
sensitivity to the factual nuances before the court. 
IV. INTERACTION WITH FEDERAL DOCTRINE 
Another distinctive feature of Justice Simonett’s constitutional 
jurisprudence was his balanced reliance upon, and distancing from, 
federal constitutional doctrine.  While federal constitutional 
principles are instructive and at times may appropriately be relied 
upon to interpret Minnesota’s constitution, “state constitutional 
doctrine must develop its own distinctive, principled approach.”39  
This balanced independence from federal constitutional law is 
most apparent in Justice Simonett’s equal protection 
jurisprudence, his analysis of Minnesota’s liberty of conscience 
clause, and his Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. decision. 
A. Equal Protection 
At both the federal and state levels, equal protection of the 
laws generally means that the law shall not apply differently to 
 
 36.  See id. at 722 (holding that the distinction between large and small 
apartment buildings “is based on distinctions which are genuine and have a 
rational basis”). 
 37.  Id. at 721 (quoting Hegenes v. State, Nos. TC-0888, TC-1284, 1982 WL 
1061, at *4 (Minn. Tax Jan. 22, 1982)). 
 38.  See id. at 722 (concluding that the taxpayer’s argument that the types of 
property at issue are similarly situated is not persuasive). 
 39.  See Simonett, supra note 1, at 239–42 (describing how Minnesota 
constitutional law has looked to federal doctrine for guidance while developing its 
own distinctive doctrines). 
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citizens who are “similarly situated.”40  Equal protection is usually 
implicated by laws that facially distinguish between classes of 
citizens or create such classifications in application.  In federal 
courts, such laws are analyzed under “strict scrutiny”41 if they create 
classifications based on race, alienage, or country of origin.42  On 
the other hand, if a law creates a classification that does not fall 
within one of these categories, or is not sufficiently analogous to 
one of them, federal courts will analyze the law under the 
deferential “rational basis review” standard.43  Unlike the Federal 
Constitution, the Minnesota Constitution does not have an equal 
protection clause.  However, it is clear that Minnesota does 
recognize a right to equal protection of the laws.  Hence, in his 
concurring opinion in State v. Russell, Justice Simonett described 
equal protection in Minnesota as an “unenumerated constitutional 
right.”44 
From a doctrinal perspective, Justice Simonett’s concurring 
opinion in Russell45 demonstrated that the court had inconsistently 
 
 40.  See State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 893 (Minn. 1991) (Simonett, J., 
concurring specially) (describing equal protection as assuring that “persons 
similarly situated are to be treated alike unless a sufficient basis exists for 
distinguishing among them”). 
 41.  See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (“Under strict 
scrutiny, the government has the burden of proving that racial classifications are 
‘narrowly tailored measures that further compelling government interests.’” 
(quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995))). 
 42.  See Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 894 (stating that under federal doctrine, courts 
apply a “heightened level of scrutiny” when “a statute classifies on the basis of race, 
alienage, [or] national origin”). 
 43.  See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (“In the ordinary case, a law 
will be sustained if it can be said to advance a legitimate government interest, even 
if the law seems unwise or works to the disadvantage of a particular group, or if the 
rationale for it seems tenuous.”).  The U.S. Supreme Court also recognizes an 
“intermediate” level of scrutiny, generally applicable when a law distinguishes on 
the basis of gender.  See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“To withstand 
constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender 
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to 
achievement of those objectives.”). 
 44.  Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 893 (Simonett, J., concurring).  
 45.  In Russell, a group of defendants challenged the constitutionality of 
imposing a harsher maximum sentence for possession of crack cocaine than for 
possession of cocaine powder.  Id. at 887 (majority opinion).  At the time, 
possession of three or more grams of crack cocaine carried a maximum sentence 
of twenty years in prison.  Id.  Possession of cocaine powder, however, did not carry 
a maximum twenty-year sentence unless the offender possessed ten or more 
grams.  Id.  The defendants persuaded the trial court to find that “crack cocaine 
[was] used predominantly by blacks and that cocaine powder [was] used 
predominantly by whites.”  Id.  Thus, they argued, the law, in effect, tended to 
8
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assessed the constitutionality of laws challenged under equal 
protection.  On the one hand, some cases had applied a test that 
was “co-extensive with the federal equal protection clause.”46  
Under this test, a statutory classification that has unintended 
discriminatory effects is constitutional so long as it is “rationally 
related to the achievement of a legitimate governmental 
purpose.”47  On the other hand, other cases had applied a three-
pronged, less deferential standard.48  According to this test, equal 
protection requires challenged laws to have “(1) a legitimate 
purpose; (2) genuine and substantial distinctions, relevant to the 
purpose of the statute, between those included and those excluded 
from the statutory classification; and (3) a reasonable connection 
between the prescribed remedy and the needs peculiar to the 
class.”49  The majority in Russell applied the latter test, causing 
Justice Simonett to reason that going forward this was the proper 
equal protection test under Minnesota’s constitution.50  He 
worried, however, that application of the test lacked sufficient 
guidance, and therefore courts would continue to apply equal 
protection confusedly.51 
Justice Simonett then presented a full equal protection test, 
which incorporated aspects of both the federal standard and the 
locally developed three-pronged test.  First, if a statute creates a 
“suspect or quasi-suspect class” or indicates the legislature’s 
 
punish African American narcotics offenders more harshly than white narcotics 
offenders.  Id.  The defendants argued that this racial classification violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution and article I, section 2, of the 
Minnesota Constitution.  See id. at 887–88.  The Minnesota Supreme Court held 
that, regardless of how federal doctrine would apply, the statute violated the 
Minnesota Constitution.  Id. at 889.  First, the court concluded that the State’s 
justification for treating the two drugs differently—emphasizing street-level 
narcotics distribution, which was apparently implicated at lower possession weights 
for crack cocaine than for cocaine powder—did not have a “genuine and 
substantial” relationship to the statutory distinctions.  Id.  The court also rejected 
the State’s arguments that crack cocaine was a more dangerous substance than 
cocaine powder, that the former was connected to more violence than the latter, 
and that therefore possession of crack cocaine deserved harsher penalties.  Id. at 
890. 
 46.  Id. at 894 (Simonett, J., concurring specially). 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  See id. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  See id. (“A majority of this court now returns to the three-factor 
uniformity clause test.  I assume, therefore, this is now our equal protection test.”). 
 51.  Id. (“A vital question remains, however: When and how is the test to be 
applied?”). 
9
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“discriminatory intent,” Justice Simonett would apply a heightened 
level of scrutiny.52  Presumably, he had in mind something 
analogous to the “strict scrutiny” that federal courts apply when a 
law discriminates on the basis of race.  If, however, the statute has 
an unintended “substantial discriminatory impact,” Justice 
Simonett would apply the three-pronged analysis described above.53 
An important distinction between this approach and the 
federal standard is that when federal courts do not sense that the 
legislature intended to discriminate on the basis of race or other 
similarly protected classes, they are highly deferential to legislative 
wisdom.  So long as there is some conceivable justification for a law, 
a federal court will uphold it—even if the identified justification 
was not the state’s actual justification.54  Justice Simonett’s 
approach, however, emphasizes the “critical importance of racial 
equality in our multicultural society.”55  Hence, where a federal 
court may be willing to justify a law on grounds that Congress never 
actually considered, Minnesota courts should be “less willing to 
conceive of the reasons for the distinctions made by the legislative 
classification.”56 
In the parlance of federal courts, Justice Simonett’s framework 
applies strict scrutiny against facially discriminatory laws and 
something similar to an “intermediate level of scrutiny”57 against 
laws that are discriminatory in effect.  While this is similar to the 
federal approach, it rejects the application of pure rational basis 
review where laws unintentionally discriminate.  In other words, 
Minnesota courts should give the legislature less deference, thereby 
encouraging it to be more considerate of the various ways that 
facially neutral laws may nevertheless create inequality. 
 
 52.  See id. at 895 (reasoning that because the statute before the court did not 
facially refer to race and because there was no fundamental right to deal drugs, 
“we have a facially neutral statute where, under federal analysis, heightened 
scrutiny is not available”). 
 53.  Id. (“I would hold that where a facially neutral criminal statute has, in its 
general application, a substantial discriminatory racial impact, this court may then 
apply its three-factor rational basis test, even though there is no showing that the 
legislature intended this impact.”). 
 54.  See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955) (stating 
that under rational basis review, “the law need not be in every respect logically 
consistent with its aims to be constitutional.  It is enough that there is an evil at 
hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative 
measure was a rational way to correct it.” (emphasis added)). 
 55.  Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 894. 
 56.  Id. at 895. 
 57.  See supra note 43. 
10
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In later opinions, Justice Simonett continued to draw a 
distinction between Minnesota and federal equal protection 
standards.  For example, writing for the majority in Mitchell v. 
Steffan, Justice Simonett declined to conduct a state equal 
protection analysis because the statute at issue violated even the 
more deferential federal standard.58  However, consistent with the 
Russell framework, in In re Blodgett, Justice Simonett suggested that 
the state and federal equal protection analyses would be co-
extensive in applying heightened levels of scrutiny when a legal 
classification implicates “the fundamental right of liberty.”59  
Although he did not have the opportunity to further develop the 
relationship between federal and state equal protection analyses, 
these opinions demonstrate that Justice Simonett’s incorporation 
and modification of the federal equal protection analysis continued 
to influence the court’s decisions in these areas. 
B. The Liberty of Conscience Clause 
In State v. Hershberger,60 the court held that Minnesota’s liberty 
of conscience clause61 was broader than the First Amendment right 
to freedom of religion.62  Justice Simonett did not write an opinion 
in the Minnesota Supreme Court’s first hearing of Hershberger.63  He 
did, however, author a concurring opinion after the U.S. Supreme 
Court remanded the case for reconsideration.64  His Hershberger II 
concurrence offers a brief, yet clear, example of Justice Simonett’s 
balanced independence from federal doctrine. 
In Hershberger I, the court was faced with the question of 
whether a local statute requiring slow-moving highway vehicles to 
bear a brightly colored triangle violated the rights of Amish horse-
 
 58.  504 N.W.2d 198, 203 (Minn. 1993) (holding that because use of a 
durational residency requirement to receive the full benefit of welfare funds 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, “[t]here is 
no need to consider whether [it] violates our state equal protection clause, and we 
do not reach that issue”). 
 59.  See 510 N.W.2d 910, 917 (Minn. 1994) (“Because the fundamental right 
of liberty is involved, we assume the United States Supreme Court would require a 
heightened degree of scrutiny for federal equal protection analysis.  And we think 
no less is required under our state constitution.” (citing Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 889 
(majority opinion), 895 (Simonett, J., concurring specially))). 
 60.  State v. Hershberger (Hershberger II), 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990). 
 61.  MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 16.  
 62.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 63.  State v. Hershberger (Hershberger I), 444 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1989). 
 64.  Hershberger II, 462 N.W.2d at 399–400 (Simonett, J. concurring).  
11
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drawn buggy drivers under either the First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution or the liberty of conscience clause of 
Minnesota’s constitution.65  The court held that prosecuting Amish 
buggy drivers violated the First Amendment.66  It reasoned that 
under federal doctrine, the State may burden a sincerely held 
religious belief only through the least restrictive means to achieving 
the government interest in question.67  The court concluded that 
although the State had a compelling interest in highway safety,68 it 
failed to show that requiring the display of a modern symbol was 
the least restrictive means to that end.69  The petitioners 
successfully persuaded the court that alternative warnings, such as 
simple reflective tape or red lanterns, would be as effective as 
orange triangles, but would not burden their religious exercise.70 
The Supreme Court of the United States vacated Hershberger I 
without discussion71 and remanded it for further consideration in 
light of the Court’s recent decision in Employment Division, 
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.72  In Smith, the 
Court held that when a generally applicable law is not religiously 
motivated and has only incidental effects on religious exercise, it 
does not violate the First Amendment simply because it is not the 
least restrictive means to achieve a compelling state interest.73 
In Hershberger II, the Minnesota Supreme Court reached the 
same conclusion it reached in Hershberger I, except it derived its 
rationale from the text and history of Minnesota’s liberty of 
conscience clause rather than the First Amendment.74  The court 
 
 65.  Hershberger I, 444 N.W.2d at 284. 
 66.  Id. at 289. 
 67.  Id. at 285 (“[T]he United States Supreme Court has considered three 
factors to predominate in an evaluation of a Free Exercise Clause claim: (1) Is the 
objector’s claim based on a sincerely held religious belief? (2) Does the 
government regulation burden the exercise of that religious belief? and, (3) Is the 
burden justified by a compelling state interest . . . ?” (citing Thomas v. Review Bd. 
of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 713–19 (1981))). 
 68.  Id. at 288 (taking judicial notice that concern for highway safety is a 
compelling state interest). 
 69.  Id. at 289. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Minnesota v. Hershberger, 495 U.S. 901, 901 (1990). 
 72.  494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 73.  Id. at 878–79 (“We have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs 
excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that 
the State is free to regulate.”). 
 74.  State v. Hershberger (Hershberger II), 462 N.W.2d 393, 399 (Minn. 1990) 
(“[I]f freedom of conscience and public safety can be achieved through use of an 
alternative to a statutory requirement that burdens freedom of conscience, . . . 
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interpreted the liberty of conscience clause to afford greater 
religious exercise rights than those enjoyed under the First 
Amendment.75  Because the liberty of conscience clause expressly 
juxtaposes religious practice with public safety, it requires that 
“once a claimant has demonstrated a sincere religious belief . . . the 
state should be required to demonstrate that public safety cannot 
be achieved by proposed alternative means.”76  Thus, just as in 
Hershberger I, the State failed to show that proposed alternatives 
were less effective at promoting highway safety and, therefore, 
Petitioners’ liberty of conscience right had been violated.77 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Simonett came to similar 
conclusions as the majority.  Specifically, he found that while the 
First Amendment does not apply against laws of general 
applicability, Minnesota’s liberty of conscience clause does.78  The 
Minnesota Constitution places more restrictions on state action 
than the Federal Constitution.79  At the same time, however, Justice 
Simonett suggested that, where appropriate, “[t]here is much to be 
said in construing the [liberty of conscience clause] in harmony 
with the nation’s First Amendment.”80  Thus, as he emphasized in 
other opinions, Justice Simonett’s reading of the liberty of 
conscience clause advocated for both reliance upon and 
independence from federal doctrine. 
C. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. 
Perhaps the most famous opinion Justice Simonett authored 
was Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,81 which the Supreme Court of the 
 
[the liberty of conscience clause] requires an allowance for such an alternative.”). 
 75.  Id. at 397 (“Whereas the first amendment establishes a limit on 
government action at the point of prohibiting the exercise of religion, [the liberty 
of conscience clause] precludes even an infringement on or an interference with 
religious freedom.”). 
 76.  Id. at 398. 
 77.  Id. at 399 (“As we found in Hershberger I, the state has failed to 
demonstrate that use of reflective tape and a lighted red lantern proposed by the 
Amish is an insufficient warning to other drivers of a slow-moving buggy.”). 
 78.  Id. at 400 (Simonett, J., concurring) (describing the liberty of conscience 
clause as enumerating “a primordial right,” which is “more emphatic” than those 
recognized by the First Amendment). 
 79.  See id. at 399–400. 
 80.  Id. at 400. 
 81.  Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. (Cohen I), 457 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1990), 
rev’d, 501 U.S. 663 (1991). 
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United States subsequently reversed and remanded.82  In Cohen, two 
local papers—the Star Tribune and the Pioneer Press—each published 
the identity of a source to whom individual reporters had 
previously guaranteed anonymity.83  The plaintiff—Dan Cohen—
consequently lost his job and filed a suit against the papers alleging 
breach of contract.84  The publishers argued that judicially 
imposing liability for printing the name of a confidential source 
violated their First Amendment rights.85 
Writing for the majority, Justice Simonett held, first, that the 
terms of this agreement were too indefinite to rise to the level of an 
enforceable contract86 and, second, that enforcing the promise 
under a promissory estoppel theory would violate the papers’ First 
Amendment rights.87  Importantly, Justice Simonett concluded that 
imposing liability would chill aspects of political reporting, a harm 
that outweighed the element of injustice caused by Cohen’s 
reliance on the promise of anonymity.88 
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed and 
remanded the case, holding that the First Amendment does not 
prevent enforcement of generally applicable laws, such as breach of 
contract and promissory estoppel.89  In other words, the fact that a 
media source is party to a transaction does not warrant applying 
“stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement against 
other persons or organizations.”90 
 
 82.  Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 672 (1991). 
 83.  Cohen I, 457 N.W.2d at 200 (“Both reporters promised to keep Cohen’s 
identity anonymous” but did not inform him that such promises were subject to 
“approval or revocation by their editors.”). 
 84.  Id. at 202 (explaining that because the information printed was true, 
Cohen’s only available legal theories were “fraudulent misrepresentation and 
breach of contract”). 
 85.  See id. at 204 (“Lurking in the background of this case has been the 
newspapers’ contention that any state-imposed sanction in this case violates their 
constitutional rights of a free press and free speech.”). 
 86.  Id. at 203 (holding that contract law is an “ill fit” to the news reporter’s 
promise of confidentiality). 
 87.  Id. at 205 (“[T]he promise of confidentiality under a promissory estoppel 
theory would violate defendants’ First Amendment rights.”). 
 88.  See id. (“The potentiality for civil damages for promises made in this 
context chills public debate, a debate which Cohen willingly entered albeit hoping 
to do so on his own terms.”). 
 89.  See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991) (“[It is] beyond 
dispute that ‘[t]he publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the 
application of general laws.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Associated 
Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937))). 
 90.  Id. 
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For those who emphasize the supremacy of the Federal 
Constitution, it is tempting to conclude that the U.S. Supreme 
Court effectively ended the constitutional dispute, leaving the state 
court to simply apply Minnesota’s contract law.  However, the U.S. 
Supreme Court explicitly recognized that even if the initial Cohen 
holding exceeded the scope of the First Amendment, the 
Minnesota Constitution may have more expansive free press 
protections.91  Thus, Justice Simonett’s second Cohen opinion92 is 
important for understanding the free press protections unique to 
Minnesota as well as Justice Simonett’s influence on the 
development of constitutional law in Minnesota. 
In Cohen II, the court declined to read article I, section 3—the 
free speech provision of the Minnesota Constitution—more 
broadly than the First Amendment.93  However, Justice Simonett’s 
opinion did not hold that local press freedoms were co-extensive 
with the First Amendment.  Rather, the court concluded that the 
facts presented by Cohen were simply too narrow to justify the 
creation of broadly applicable constitutional guidelines in the 
context of a reporter’s confidentiality promise.94  In this sense, 
although the court followed the Supreme Court of the United 
States’ lead by permitting Cohen to proceed under a promissory 
estoppel theory, it did so in the name of Justice Simonett’s ultimate 
goal for state constitutional law: giving “careful thought . . . to 
building a sound foundation.”95 
V. CONCLUSION 
Justice Simonett witnessed a revival of state constitutional law 
in Minnesota and across the nation.  Across a variety of substantive 
areas, Justice Simonett helped develop and clarify the Minnesota 
Constitution’s role.  In particular, he promoted a theory of general 
principles, which permitted the state legislature greater latitude in 
 
 91.  See id. at 672 (“[P]erhaps the State Constitution may be construed to 
shield the press from a promissory estoppel cause of action . . . .”). 
 92.  Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. (Cohen II), 479 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. 1992). 
 93.  Id. at 391 (“We may, of course, construe our free speech provision to 
afford broader protection than the federal clause; however, we decline to do so in 
this case.”). 
 94.  Id. (“The enforceability of promises of confidentiality given a news 
source is an issue of first impression, and this case presents only one variation of 
such promises.  The full First Amendment implications of this new issue may not 
yet have surfaced.”). 
 95.  See Simonett, supra note 1, at 228. 
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its law-making power.  He also helped to give the state constitution 
its own content, independent of the U.S. Constitution, thereby 
advancing a uniquely Minnesotan body of law. 
Justice John Simonett was a giant on the court in developing 
constitutional law in Minnesota.  It is a pleasure to join in this 
Tribute to Justice Simonett by discussing his opinions in which 
these principles were established. 
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